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We postulate a new method of identifying debt which we call Debt Burden (DB). We 
claim that DB reveals the true debt obligations of the fiscal authority. It is more accurate 
and transparent.  Hence, DB would serve fiscal authority much better in policy making. It 
is powerful in a sense that it is calculated on a daily basis and can serve as a good policy 
measure since it includes projections into the future.  
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Is there a better approach to measure Turkey’s total public debt burden? The more 
common approach to announce Turkey’s public debt has traditionally been in the form of 
revealing the stock of total debt or the approaching interest payments that the government 
needs to satisfy its current debt service agreements. 
 
The debt service, which is close to our approach, is announced on a monthly frequency, 
which fails to capture fluctuations and the information embodied in the volatility of 
shorter frequencies. 
 
In this paper, we will concentrate our analysis on daily changes of the total public debt 
service. This innovation allows us to investigate episodes of differing volatilities in 
Turkey’s recent fiscal history. 
 
Our approach clearly reveals periods of financial distress in the years of 2000 and 2001. 
Although, the crisis of 2001 was presented as an outcome of political conflict, it was 
rather inherent in the accumulated debt burden for the period that involved the crises
1. 
 
The next section provides some background on debt sustainability, which is followed by 
Methodology in section 3. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results and 
finally section 6 concludes. The two appendices that are provided at the end summarizes 




Most governments engage in debt (both foreign and domestic) thinking that it is a sort of 
investment which will improve on the current economic situation. In essence government 
debt has the same principles as any other types of borrowing. However, its consequences 
are somewhat different. 
 
Debt burden has more effect on developing country economies than it was expected. 
Because of negatively affected private investments (overhang affect), and public 
investments (budget deficit), economic growth will become slower than expected. Some 
indebted countries are trapped to continue transferring funds to the rest of the world by 
financing the repayment of earlier period obligations with new borrowings (unless it 
receives high returns from its borrowing, for instance by increasing exports rapidly by 
reallocating resources). 
 
When economists consider the burden of foreign debt, they usually think of the cost to 
the debtor country of making a transfer to the rest of the world. The debt burden is 
measured simply as the discounted flow of resources that the debtor country must provide 
                                                 
1 The political distress, in fact, had only a trigger effect in the crisis: During the National Security Council 
Meeting on ….2001, the President of Turkey and the Prime Minister had an argument over the constitution, 
where the Turkish Constitution became “airborne”. This event is now known as the “Constitution 
Incidence” in the recent Turkish political history. 
  1to its creditors. But over and above the transfer burden is the enormous deadweight loss 




A recent paper by Karagol (2002) applies a cointegration analysis to investigate the 
relationship between external debt and growth. The economic literature has indicated 
several direct and indirect channels through which a large foreign debt affects investment 
and finally negatively output: 
 
• The “debt overhang effect”, which refers to the reduced incentives to invest, 
• The high domestic real rates due to the impaired access to international credit, 
• The low probability due to the downturn in economic activity; the decrease in 
public investment that is complementary to private investment38. 
 
The debt overhang hypothesis indicates that the accumulated debt act as a tax on future 
output; discouraging productive investment plans of private sector and adjustment efforts 
on the part of governments. So even after some improvement in the economic production, 
it can conclude higher debt repayments, because foreign debt acts like a tax on future 
production and export. 
 
Debt overhang theory is based on the premise that if debt will exceed the country’s 
repayment ability with some probability in the future, expected debt service is likely to be 
an increasing function of the country’s output level. Sachs (1986) and Kenen (1990) 
argue that external debt overhang plays an important role in heavily indebted countries. 
Thus debt overhang is one of the main reasons for slowing economic growth in indebted 
countries. In addition to that, how a debt overhang discourages private investment 
depends on how the government is expected to raise the resources needed to finance 
external debt service and whether private and public sector investments are 
complementary. 
 
Karagol (2002)’s results of his causality test prove that debt service has a significant 
negative effect on GNP with one-year lag. Hence, in the case of Turkey, debt service has 
a “debt overhang effect” on GNP. 
 
Since borrowing provides additional resources that the economy could not generate by 
itself, it creates demand for commodities or investments. If a country basically uses the 
borrowed foreign capital for production rather than consumption (imports), it can 
generate more goods (exports) and revenues (foreign currency) in the future. Thus these 
revenues enable them to fulfill their debt service obligations and purchase imports easier 
in the future. 
 
International borrowing has two faces. It gives the incentives for economy to enlarge 
beyond its domestic limits; it also causes a high degree of unsteadiness into the system. 
Afxentiou and Serletis (1996) argued that if foreign loans were converted into capital and 
other necessary inputs, development would occur. On the other hand, if the borrower 
  2countries misallocate resources or waste them on consumption, then economic 
development is negatively effected. 
 
Hence, sound debt management strategies become crucial for indebted developing 
countries like Turkey. 
 
The recent raise in the frequency and severity of financial crisis in developing countries 
can be seen as another proof of the important role of an efficient functioning debt 
management office for highly indebted countries, like Turkey.  
 
Debt management office has significant functions in the treasury department, and 
specifically focuses on the debt structure of the country. It mainly monitors the major 
variables of debt structure such as, interest rates, maturity, and exchange rate. Monitoring 
provides reducing the risk that can rise during sudden changes in the economic and 
political environment. Since Turkey’s public debt is significant it is vital to manage the 
public debt of the country more efficiently. Turkey does not have a debt management 
office but recently new government implemented new debt management regulations that 
provide efficiency. 
 
The Treasury Department has traditionally monitored the debt burden of Turkey. The 
goal of the department is to reduce the total debt stock by increasing the consolidated 
budget balance (Ates, 2002) (excluding interest payments). Increasing that balance will 
reduce the obligations and provide more flexibility in management of the debt stock. 
 
As stated in Treasury reports of 2003, Turkey’s debt consists of approximately 49.3% 
fixed and 50.7% variable interest rate. In addition, the total debt is 51.2% contingent on 
Turkish Lira, and 48.8% contingent on Foreign exchange. We can also see that during 
2003, average maturity increased and average cost of new borrowings declined. 
 
The good conditions in the global financial markets (falling interest rates), and the 
improvements in Turkish economy (falling inflation and interest rates), decreased the cost 
of borrowing (both domestic and external) during 2003.  
 
However, since roughly 50% of external and domestic debt includes variable interest 
rates, they are still vulnerable to any future changes in interest rates and we expected 
changes and their rapid effect on the economy should be forecasted. Moreover, foreign 
exchange risk needs also to be considered because approximately, 50% of the total debt is 
in foreign currency.  
  33 Methodology 
 
Our approach is to calculate a fiscal gap which is derived from an intertemporal budget 
constraint. What if the government decides to pay the principal and accrued interest of its 
debt at a specific time in the future? Wouldn’t this question be more appropriate to 
describe the sustainability of debt. Investors at any point in time, among other factors, 
consider total obligations of the government in deciding the risk premium that they 
determine. But in some cases as Bulow and Rogoff (1989) suggests, a debtor who is in 
difficulty can negotiate to fulfill the interest portion of the debt and renegotiate the 
payment of the principal at a future date.  
 
In this respect, our approach resembles the investigation of intertemporal government 
obligations rather than annual budget figures in describing the stance of fiscal policy. The 
current legislate which determines the size and the magnitude of annual budget does not 
necessarily correlate with the government obligations that will appear in the future. This 
issue has recently been re-emphasized in Kotlikoff (1986, 1988 and 1993) and Gokhale 
and Smetters (2003). Therefore, it is imperative to look at the future obligations of the 
government in determining the sustainability of the government debt.  
 
Our method is to project components of the government obligations (government debt 
and expenditures) and revenues (taxes, seigniorage, privatization, Central Bank assets) 
and make an assessment about the future stresses that the fiscal authority will face. This 
allows us to determine the direction of the upcoming fiscal liabilities. The most important 
component of the fiscal gap is to determine the future debt obligations of the government. 
To demonstrate that we need to address the question of whether the government will meet 
its principal and/or interest payments of the debt in the future and if so what will be the 
size of these payments.  
 
Each bond issue is characterized by several parameters. Let’s denote B as the size of the 
issue, b as the date of the issue, s is the payment date with of the principal with accrued 
interest. And let’s denote t as the date that we stand. Date t could be before, during or 
after this particular bond issue. Therefore, the value of a bond i at time t (VBi,t) can be 
represented by the following formula 
 
  ,, ,(1 )
tb
ibt ib i VB B r
− =+  (1.1) 
 
for t=1,…,T. This states that if the Treasury would like to honor the outstanding bond 
issue with its accumulated interest, VBi,t  is the magnitude of the payment that it will 
make. Notice that (1.1) assumes away renegotiation of debt in terms of interest and 
rescheduling of payments. However, (1.1) can be used to determine a renegotiation of 
principal and interest payments. As explained in the data section, Treasury has a variety 
of instruments of auctions which may appear to have different formulas for accumulated 
interest, although this is the case, each of these bond issues can still be represented by 
(1.1), it is simply a labeling issue.  
 
  4The next step is to determine the total accumulated debt, this is done by Equation (1.2), 
we simply sum over all outstanding bonds at time t for t=1,… ,T. 
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We call (1.2) Debt Burden (DB) which includes both the debt stock and the debt service 
components of public borrowing. Note that DBt is independent of base year b for each 
outstanding bond issue. Moreover, DBt does not include any bond issue that matured 




Given 1.1 & 1.2 we can write the intertemporal budget constraint
3 of the government as 
follows. 
 
  () 1 ttt t t t t TSP N R D BGD B − +++ ∆ + =+  (1.3) 
for t=1,…,T.  
 
Here T is the tax revenues, S is the seigniorage revenues, P is the revenues from 
privatization and liquidization of other public assets such as land, buildings etc., NR is 
the net reserves of the Central Bank
4, G is the government expenditure. The first 
component on the left hand side is the revenues where as the right hand side is the 
payments that the government has to make in every period. Therefore, if the time period t 
is a year, then the government decides on the current period debt as the excess of 
payments over revenues.
5 In our analysis we can interpret DBt-1 as the principal, interest 
or principal and interest obligations of the government where as DBt is simply the 
necessary borrowing requirement that government faces to balance budget. Therefore, 
sustainability of the debt is simply the size and magnitude of DBt with respect to 
macroecononomic fundamentals, such as money supply, GDP, tax revenues etc.  
 
 
4 Data   
 
The Turkish Government’s consolidated debt can be categorized under two primary 
headings: Domestic Debt and External Debt. Domestic debt is any kind of debt that is 
issued both in the national currency, Turkish Lira (TL), and foreign currency through 
domestic financial markets. Whereas, external debt is the one that is issued to foreign 
residents both in TL and foreign currency, however Turkey has not been successful to 
                                                 
2 Debt obligations is different than debt stock. Notice that debt stock does not include interest obligations 
therefore may understate the obligations of each issue. 
3 Or annual budget if we use time period as one year 
4 Central Bank total reserves minus Dresdner account minus Central Bank’s total external debt obligations.  
5 This must fluctuate around 0, we are looking for deviations from zero in higher magnitudes. 
 
  5borrow in international markets with TL. Over the course of last 4 years, the variety of 
instruments used in auctions have grown.  
 
For domestic issues the following instruments are used: Switching Auctions, Floating 
Rate Notes (FRN) Auctions, FX Denominated Floating Rate Notes Auctions, Discounted 
FX Denominated Treasury Auctions, Fixed Couponed TL Denominated Treasury 
Auctions, Discounted TL Denominated Treasury Auctions, Non - Auction Sales 
 
For foreign issues the following instruments are used: Fixed Couponed foreign currency 
Denominated Treasury Auctions, Loans from International Institutions and Foreign 
Governments,  Treasury Guaranteed Credits. 
 
Our data set is daily gathered from the Undersecretariat of Treasury for the period 1998 – 
2003.  The calculations are done on a daily basis. To convert the daily figures to monthly 
figures we averaged daily figures within a month. The rest of the details with respect to 
calculations and assumptions are presented in the appendix. Appendix 1, presents a more 
detailed analysis of Equations (1.1) and (1.2). Note that different type of instruments have 
different methods of calculations, however, all these methods can be represented with the 
above two equations. Appendix 2 provides details with respect to our assumptions for 
forecasts.  
 
Table 1 provides some details about the Turkish public debt stock, it provides us a clear 
picture for the rapid growth of debt in the period of analysis. On the contrary to 
expectations, the impact of Russian crisis averaged out by high inflation rates in that year 
that helps the government to get rid of a significant portion of the interest burden. 
However, declining inflation and 2001 Turkish financial crises became the primary 
determinants of positive and significantly high real interest rates and lower maturities.
6  
 
TABLE 1 – DOMESTIC DEBT SUMMARY 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
# of Auctions  31 59 39 89  124 85 
TL  31 59 36 66 92 73 
USD 0  0  3  22  21  8 
EURO  0 0 0 1  11 4 
Average  Maturity-DAYS       
TL  1028 1019  819  696 1051  899 
USD      1825 730  1401 528 
EURO       1826  993  654 
Average Interest Rate       
TL  -0.01  -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.27 0.18 
USD       0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 





                                                 
6 We prefer the present maturity in terms of days since our methodology is based on daily calculations. 
  65 Results 
 
As explained in the methodology section, our results will differ from the debt stock 
figures announced by the Republic of Turkey Undersecretariat of Treasury (UT from now 
on). The reason of this discrepancy is the innovation of our method. We include the 
interest burden as well as the principal payments to identify the real total debt burden of 
Turkey on a daily basis. The UT calculates the debt stock by only considering the 
outstanding debt stock excluding the forthcoming interest payments. In this paper we 
incorporate both debt stock and debt service into one measure that we call debt burden 
(DB). We claim that DB reveals the true debt obligations of the fiscal authority. It is more 
accurate and transparent. Hence, DB would serve fiscal authority much better in policy 
making. Graph 1 presents this difference for the 1998 – 2003 period on a monthly basis. 
Figures are in billion US dollars at the end of the calendar year. The total debt stock of 
Turkey nearly tripled since 1998.  
 
The first thing to note on Graph 1 is the difference between the two figures and this 
difference becomes more significant during times of financial distress. We observe that 
real interest payments drive a significant wedge. As of December 2003, Debt Burden is 
slightly around 230 billion US dollars where as Treasury’s stock figure is around 200 
billion US dollars. The difference is 15%. This difference is clearly seen in Graph 2, 
which is the percentage difference between Debt Burden and Treasury Debt Stock. An 
average of 10% difference can be observed in between two calculations. Given the size of 
the debt stock this difference accounts for 20 billion US dollars, also corresponding to 
8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
We observe a growing trend in the DB, however we need to normalize this figure with 
respect to some macroeconomic aggregate to control for the growth rate of the economy. 
M2Y, which is the Monetary aggregate that includes currency in circulation, checking 
and savings deposits both in TL and foreign currency serves this purpose. Moreover, 
M2Y also can be used as an indicator for debt sustainability. Note that Treasury issues 
requires an increase in demand for money. If money market clears than in equilibrium 
M2Y will match the demand. Graph 3 presents the ratio of M2Y to DB. This ratio more 
than quadrupled in the analysis period. Although we observe a slowdown in the latter 
period, due to current disinflation program this ratio has potential to grow.  
 
The motivation of our analysis lies on the daily nature of our calculations. Our claim is 
that, monthly data is not as transparent as the daily data. In addition, it does not present 
the true cost of the burden. We will take two steps to address these issues. Graph 4 
displays the daily DB, notice the fluctuations on this high frequency data. Most of these 
fluctuations are caused by the preparation of the Treasury for the upcoming payments. 
Since Government income is far from covering the change in debt, Treasury holds 
auctions frequently in order to borrow to pay the amortizing debt. As indicated on Table 
1 the number of auctions grew significantly until the end of 2002 where it reached a level 
of 124 auctions just to borrow from domestic markets. This number excludes the external 
borrowing. The decline in the number of auctions in 2003 is not surprising. As a result of 
IMF stand-by agreement in 2001, IMF credit was used to substitute domestic issues. 




An important result of Graph 4, that was also apparent in Graph 1, is the acceleration of 
debt burden in the past two years. Due to declining inflation and stable nominal interest 
rates, on average UT paid 27 and 18 percent real return on domestic issues in the years 
2002 and 2003, respectively (Table 1). This in turn is reflected as a convex trend line in 
Graph 4.  
 
Graph 4 also clearly identifies the two financial crises in November 2000 and February 
2001. These are sharp drops and increases in the DB measures over these periods. 
Monthly data averages these two sets of spikes, one from financial distress and other 
from UT preparations for upcoming auctions. In this way, it is unable to capture the costs 
associated with volatility in higher frequencies. Table 2 displays the difference in both 
volatility figures. As expected daily volatility is higher than monthly. In order to compare 
the 4 standard deviation measures, we normalized standard deviations with the average of 
the sample. The last row represents the volatility comparisons.  
 
The first two columns are on a monthly basis, DB has a slightly higher volatility than 
debt stock over monthly basis, however the difference between the two figures has 50 













Debt Burden (DB) 
Average             48,868      55,109         7,992   53,087 
Standard Dev          102,466    112,907        10,441   105,207 
Ave/STDEV               0.48         0.49           0.77   1.98 
 
The next step is to extend the volatility analysis to capture the costs associated with daily 
volatilities. In order to do that we have to figure out the contribution of DB volatility on 
the cost of financing. A good proxy for the cost of financing is the EMBI+ published by 
JPMorgan. The index is a weighted average of the prices of outstanding bonds, therefore 
does represent the return on investment on the debt instrument. We take the change in the 
cumulative total return index for Turkey as our endogenous variable
8. Our explanatory 
variables is AR(1) and the daily volatility in DB.  
 
One can expect that investors by looking at yesterday’s bond return make their 
investment decisions therefore naming their prices for the upcoming auctions. This in 
turn determines the rate of return. However, if we believe in the Rational Expectations 
(RE) Theory, a forward looking investors will use all available information out there 
                                                 
7 We are leaving the substitution of external to domestic borrowing for another project. There is an 
extensive literature on this topic especially during the Asian Financial crises.  
8 EMBI+ on the levels has a unit root, first differencing solves this problem. 
  8before making the decision. Therefore, an investor acting upon RE will use the future 
developments in DB to determine the expected return on bonds. We provide evidence on 
the contrary for forward looking behavior. The results for the former argument are 
provided below. 
 
   (1.4)  13 .14 .04 log tt t EMBI c EMBI DB error −− ∆ = +∆ +∆ +
        (1.83)             (1.71) 
 
The figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Coefficients are significant at 10% level. 
DBt-3 is the only significant variable among the lags which provides evidence towards 
UT’s preparation motive for the upcoming auction few days in advance. Given the 
regression results we provide our calibration exercise below (Table 3).  
  
We ask the question of what is associated gain with a 33 percent and 50 percent reduction 
in the daily volatility. The monetary gain would be 4.4 and 6.7 billion US dollars, 
respectively. The columns represents the gain as a percentage of M2Y, Central Bank 
Reserves and output. A reduction in volatility by half will induce a gain of 2.7 percent of 
GDP.  
 
Table 3 – Calibration Exercise   
   




Annual savings (1/3 reduction in volatility)           4,447  4.3  13.2  1.8 






Our results indicate that focusing on daily volatility would significant gains to the 
country. The methodology we use is more transparent since it reveals every development 
of the Debt Burden of the fiscal authority. The data set is strong and does inherits the 
characteristics of high frequency data with thick tails and excess skewness. This may 
allow us to examine research topics of sort fiscal dominance in monetary policy making, 
determinants of interest and exchange rate volatility. The impact of treasury auctions on 
the secondary markets and so on.  
 
We are confident that daily analysis will provide a policy maker a stronger policy tool in 
risk management and crisis prediction. In this respect, our methodology is a good 
candidate for policy making. Moreover, we can also use our methodology in suggesting 
sustainability of debt through intertemporal budget constraint calculations since it 
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  14APPENDIX 1 - CALCULATIONS 
 
 
BONDS WITH COUPON PAYMENTS 
 
 
COMPOUND ANNUAL INTEREST RATE = R 
MATURITY = D 
AMOUNT = T 
DAILY INTEREST RATE (I) FORMULA = ((1+R)^(1/(365))-1)  
 
 




ST DAY  = T 
2
ND DAY = T*(1+I) 
3
RD DAY = (T*(1+I))*(1+I) 
4





N TH DAY = ((T*((1+I)^(N-1)))     LETS CALL THIS NUMBER = T (n) 
(N+1) TH DAY  COUPON PAYMENT =  ((Tn)-(Tn-T))*(1+I)           LETS CALL THIS NUMBER T (n+1) 







END OF PERIOD (LETS SAY 300













ST DAY  = T 
2
ND DAY = T*(1+I) 
3
RD DAY = (T*(1+I))*(1+I) 
4





END OF PERIOD (LETS SAY 100




  15BONDS INDEXED TO INFLATION OR OTHER INTEREST RATES 
 
 
ALL THINGS WILL BE THE SAME AS ABOVE, EXCEPT (I).   
 
•  IF WE USE EXPECTED INFLATION (INF) AS INTEREST RATES, (INF) TAKES PLACE OF 
(I).  
•  IF WE USE EXPECTED INFLATION (INF) PLUS INTEREST RATES, (I) BECOMES: 
(I+INF). 
•  IF WE USE LIBOR RATE (L) AS INTEREST RATES, (L) TAKES PLACE OF (I). 
•  IF WE USE LIBOR RATE (L) PLUS INTEREST RATES, (I) BECOMES: (L+I). 
 
NOTE: INFLATION AND LIBOR VALUES SHOULD BE IN DAILY VALUES WHILE 
CALCULATING DAILY DEBT SERVICE. 
 
    
 
INTEREST PAYMENTS (FOR ALL KINDS OF BONDS) 
 
 
BOND        INTEREST 
 
1
ST DAY  = T          1
ST DAY  = 0 
2
ND DAY = T*(1+I)        2
ND DAY = (T*(1+I))- T 
3
RD DAY = (T*(1+I))*(1+I)      3
RD DAY = ((T*(1+I))*(1+I))- (T*(1+I))  
4
TH DAY = ((T*(1+I))*(1+I))*(1+I)    4
TH DAY = (((T*(1+I))*(1+I))*(1+I))-
((T*(1+I))*(1+I)) 
.        .  
.        .  








WE USED TURKISH LIRA VALUES AND US DOLLAR VALUES, FOR ALL 
CALCULATIONS. ALSO WE PERFORMED 3 DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR DIFFERENT 




AFTER CALCULATING ALL THE AUCTIONS, WE ADDED THEM TOGETHER WITHIN 
THEIR SPECIFIC TIME INTERVALS. THEN WE FOUND OUT HOW MUCH DEBT SERVICE DOES 





  16Appendix 2 - ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
Foreign Bonds: We assumed there are annual coupon payments for foreign bond issues. 
 
Scenarios: We prepared three scenario analysis based on 3 different interest rate, 
inflation, exchange rate, Libor and Euribor rates  
 
Interest Rates: We made assumptions for future interest rates based on our inflation 
estimations plus 8%, 7%, 6%, 5%, 4%, 3%, 2% for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010 respectively.    
 
Inflation: There are 3 different assumptions for the future inflation rates. Best case based 
on the inflation that we expect for the future, worst case is based on the values of other 
sources. Most likely case is based on the average of these two rates.  
 




                                                 
9 We can provide the numbers upon request. 
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